This paper studies a generalization of the consensus value (cf. Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004) ) to the class of partition function form games. The concepts and axioms, related to the consensus value, are extended. This value is characterized as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. Moreover, it is shown that this value satisfies the individual rationality under a certain condition, and well balances the tradeoff between coalition effects and externality effects. By modifying the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for the value is established. A further generalization of the consensus value is discussed. Finally, two applications of the consensus value are given: one is for oligopoly games in partition function form and the other is about participation incentives in free-rider situations.
Introduction
The problem of sharing the joint gains of cooperation is well captured by cooperative game theory. The Shapley value (Shapley (1953) ) has been proven to be the most studied and widely used single-valued solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) in characteristic function form as it satisfies some desirable properties. In some sense, the value captures the expected outcome of a game, and represents a distinct approach to the problems of complex strategic interactions that game theory seeks to illuminate (Roth (1988) ).
However, considering an economy with externalities one cannot easily recommend a division of the joint profits in the same way as the final profits depend on the coalition structure which has been formed. This feature was first captured by Thrall and Lucas (1963) by the concept of partition function form games: A partition function assigns a value to each pair consisting of a coalition and a coalition structure which includes that coalition. The advantage of this model is that it takes both internal factors (coalition itself) and external factors (coalition structure) that may affect cooperation outcomes into account and allows to go deeper into cooperation problems. Thus, it is closer to real life although more complex to analyse.
Values for such games can be found in Myerson (1977) , Bolger (1989) , Feldman (1994) , Potter (2000) , and Pham Do and Norde (2002) . All of them are in some way extensions of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953) ) for cooperative TU games in characteristic function form. Myerson (1977) introduced a value based on the extensions of the three axioms in the Shapley's original paper. Bolger's value assigns zero to dummies and assigns nonnegative values to players in monotone simple games. Potter (2000) added another axiom, coalitional symmetry, and reformed the regular definition of the dummy player such that the dummy player can get nonnegative worth. But note that a null player defined in this paper still gets zero worth by Potter's value. When |N | = 3, Potter's value coincides with the values introduced by Bolger and Feldman. But they are different when |N | > 3. The difference is due to the fact that Potter defined the worth of each embedded coalition as the average worth. Pham Do and Norde (2002) studied another extension of the Shapley value for the class of partition function form games, which is the average of a collection of marginal vectors. Fujinaka (2004) provided alternative characterizations for the Shapley value defined by Pham Do and Norde (2002) based on a marginality axiom and a monotonicity axiom. Moreover, he found an error in the proof of the axiomatization which is based on the axiom of additivity in Pham Do and Norde (2002) and amended it in his paper.
This paper takes a different perspective and aims to derive a solution concept which not only satisfies "reasonable" properties but also has a constructive sharing procedure. Following a simple and natural way of generalizing the standard solution for 2-person partition function form games into n-person cases, a new solution concept for partition function form games is obtained: the consensus value. It is, in fact, a natural extension of the consensus value for TU games in characteristic function form introduced in Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004) . This value differs from all the previous values as it is characterized to be the unique function that satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, additivity and the quasi-null player property. The first three requirements are relatively weak, especially the property of complete symmetry is a natural and obvious requirement. A quasi-null player is a player who has zero payoff in the complete breakdown situation (every player stands alone) and whose marginal contributions to all non-empty coalitions are also zero. Instead of the "regular" marginal contribution perspective requiring zero payoff to a quasi-null player (we may call it the marginal quasi-null player property) which is implicitly specified by the Shapley value in Pham Do and Norde (2002), this paper introduces the so-called quasi-null player property based on the positive or negative externalities that the quasi-null player might benefit or suffer from. One may argue that the efficiency 1 postulate and the marginal quasi-null player property seem to be contradictory to each other when considering solution concepts for partition function form games because a quasi-null player, given the positive externalities she might enjoy, can hardly participate in coalitions where she contributes nothing and will get zero payoff. More generally, we have no reason to ignore the externality effect in partition function form games while the marginal quasi-null player property rules out the considerations on externalities and completely favors coalitions. That is, from the positive externality point of view, any quasi-null player could obtain nonnegative worth when standing alone, and analogously, she might get nonpositive worth in the presence of negative externality, which opens up the possibility to relax the marginal quasi-null player postulate. In this spirit, the quasi-null player property is introduced and discussed.
By defining the expected stand-alone value, we can determine, in some sense, the maximum and minimum that a quasi-null player might get in a game due to the positive and negative externalities 2 , respectively. In order to balance the tradeoff between those two contrastive opinions, i.e. emphasizing coalitions or focusing on externalities, we make a fair compromise and take the average as the value for a quasi-null player, resulting in the 1 A more general criticism on the efficiency postulate can be traced back to Luce and Raiffa (1957) ; and, more recently, is seen in Maskin (2003) . 2 More strictly, since the externalities from different coalitions imposed on a player could be both positive and negative in a game, the expected stand-alone value is just a value focusing on externalities, in contrast with the value derived from the contributions to coalitional values.
quasi-null player property. At the same time, introducing the quasi-null player property actually affects all other players in the same way such that any player's value is determined by her contributions to coalitions and the externalities imposed on her if stand-alone, which is further confirmed by the general formula of the consensus value: It is the average of the Shapley value introduced by Pham Do and Norde (2002) and the expected stand-alone value.
A novel feature of the consensus value for TU games in characteristic function form is its underlying sharing process. It is shown in this paper that such a process is particularly suitable for the settings of games in partition function form because, given a coalition structure, the standard solution for 2-person partition function form games can be well implemented. Here, given an ordering of players, we also take a bilateral perspective and consider to allocate the joint surplus of an existing coalition of players (i.e., the incumbents) and an entrant, which means that the unilateral viewpoint like the marginal contribution approach focusing on entrants is abandoned. By taking the incumbents as one party and the entrant as a second party, the standard solution for 2-person games can be applied all the way with consensus. That is, all the joint surpluses are always equally split between the corresponding two parties. Since no specific ordering is pre-determined, we average over all possible permutations. Hence, by this rule, not only the concern of all the possible orderings but also what happens in each ordering are mutually accepted: Consensus is obtained.
By means of the transfer property, a second characterization for the consensus value is provided. Based on a modification of the stand-alone reduced game introduced in Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004) and a related recursive formula, the consensus value for partition function form games is reformulated. Furthermore, by introducing a share parameter on the splitting of joint surpluses, a generalization of the consensus value is obtained. In particular, the Shapley value and the expected stand-alone value are the two polar cases of the generalized consensus value. Accordingly, characterizations for the expected stand-alone value are obtained. A special case of the partition function form games is that any player's stand-alone values are the same as that in the complete breakdown situation. Then, the consensus value is equivalent to that in TU games in characteristic function form, which equals to the average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution.
In addition to this section introducing the paper and reviewing the seminal works briefly, the remaining part proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly recall the basic features of partition function form games. In section 3, we address 2-person partition function form games and take the corresponding solutions as a standardization and define the consensus value for partition function form games. The consensus value is characterized in an axiomatic way in section 4. It is shown that the consensus value is the average of the Shapley value for partition function form games and the expected standalone value. Section 5 discusses a generalization of this solution concept. The final section shows the applications of the consensus value by providing two illustrative examples: one is about oligopoly games in partition function form and the other is about the participation incentives in free-rider situations.
Preliminaries
This section, based on Pham Do and Norde (2002), recalls some basic definitions and notations related to games in partition function form.
A partition κ of the player set N , a so-called coalition structure, is a set of mutually disjoint coalitions, κ = {S 1 , ..., S m }, so that their union is N . Let P(N ) be the set of all partitions of N . For any coalition S ⊂ N , the set of all partitions of S is denoted by P(S). A typical element of P(S) is denoted by κ S . Note that two partitions will be considered equal if they differ only by the insertion or deletion of ∅. That is, {{1, 2}, {3}} = {{1, 2}, {3}, ∅}.
A pair (S, κ) consisting of a coalition S and a partition κ of N to which S belongs is called an embedded coalition, and is nontrivial if S = ∅. Let E(N ) denote the set of embedded coalitions, i.e. . It will be convenient to economize brackets and suppress the commas between elements of the same coalition. Thus, where no confusion can arise, we will write, for example, w({i, j, k}, {{i, j, k}, {l, h}}) as w(ijk, {ijk, lh}), and w({i, j, k}, {l, h}) asw(ijk, lh). For a partition κ ∈ P(N ) and i ∈ N , we denote the coalition in κ to which player i belongs by S(κ, i). 
and player 2 gets
That is, the (net) surplus generated by the cooperation between player 1 and 2,
is equally shared between the two players. This solution is called the standard solution for 2-person partition function form games. Then, we consider a generalization of the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases. It follows the following line of reasoning.
Consider a 3-person game (N, w) with player set N = {1, 2, 3}. Suppose we have the ordering (1, 2, 3): player 1 shows up first, then player 2, and finally player 3. When player 2 joins 1, we in fact have a 2-person situation where the surplus sharing problem is solved by the standard solution. Next, player 3 enters the scene, who would like to cooperate with player 1 and 2. Because coalition {12} has already been formed before she joins, player 3 will actually cooperate with the existing coalition {12} instead of simply cooperating with 1 and 2 individually. If {12} agrees to cooperate with player 3 as well, the value of the grand coalition, w(123, {123}) will be generated. Now, the question is how to share it? Again, following the standard solution to 2-person games, one can argue that both parties should get half of the joint surplus
in addition to their stand-alone payoffs. The reason is simple: coalition {12} should be regarded as one player instead of two players because they have already formed a cooperating coalition. Internally, 1 and 2 will receive equal shares of the surplus because this part is obtained extra by the coalition {12} cooperating with coalition {3}.
One can also tell the story in a reverse way, which yields the same outcome in terms of surplus sharing. Initially, three players cooperate with each other and w(123, {123}) is obtained. We now consider players leaving the existing coalitions one by one in the opposite order (3, 2, 1). So player 3 leaves first. By the standard solution for 2-person games, player 3 should get half of the joint surplus plus her stand-alone payoff, i.e.
as 1 and 2 remain as one cooperating coalition {12}. Thus, the value left for coalition {12}, which we call the standardized remainder (the value left for the corresponding remaining coalition) for {12}, is
In the same fashion, the standardized remainder for {1} will be
Extending this argument to an n-person case, we then have a general method, which can be understood as a standardized remainder rule since we take the later entrant (or earlier leaver) and all her pre-entrants (or post-leavers) as two parties and apply the standard solution for 2-person games all the way. Furthermore, since no ordering is pre-determined for a partition function form game, we will average all possible orderings.
Formally, for a game in partition function form we shall define the standardized remainder as follows. 
Hence, the consensus value can be interpreted as the expected individual standardized remainder that a player can get by participating in coalitions. With σ : {1, 2, 3} −→ N defined by σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 1 and σ(3) = 3, which is shortly denoted by σ = (2 1 3), we get
And one can readily calculate
and s Similar to the stand-alone recursion of the consensus value for TU games in characteristic function form, we can reformulate the consensus value for partition function form games by modifying the stand-alone reduced game and defining a corresponding recursive formula.
Formally, let f : P G ) defined by for all κ N \{i} ∈ P(N \{i}) and for all S ∈ κ N \{i}
the stand-alone reduced game of w with respect to player i. We say that a solution concept f satisfies the stand-alone recursion if and only if for any game w ∈ P G N with |N | ≥ 3 we have
One can readily check that the consensus value is the unique one-point solution concept on the class of all n-person partition function form games with n ≥ 2 which is standard for 2-person partition function form games and satisfies stand-alone recursion.
Characterizations
This section characterizes the consensus value for partition function form games in an axiomatic way. 
Definition 4.2 In a partition function form game w
So, a null player always makes zero marginal contributions to any coalition and obtains zero payoff when standing alone. Moreover, we define a quasi-null player as follows.
Definition 4.3 In a game w
Thus, a quasi-null player i will be a null player if w({i}, κ N \{i} ∪ {{i}}) = 0 for all κ N \{i} ∈ P(N \{i}).
By Definition 2.3, one can find that Φ i (w) = 0 for all w ∈ P G N and for any quasi-null player i in (N, w), which implies that the Shapley value is not so convincing: If a quasi-null player can get positive payoffs due to positive externalities, i.e., w({i}, κ N \{i} ∪ {{i}}) > 0 for all κ N \{i} ∈ P(N \{i}), why would she join the others to form the grand coalition and obtain zero payoff finally?
In order to find how much a quasi-null player should obtain, we first introduce the concept of expected stand-alone value. For a partition function form game w ∈ P G N and a player i ∈ N , we define player i's expected stand-alone value as
The expected stand-alone value tells us how much a player may obtain in a partition function form game (N, w) when we focus on the stand-alone side of the game . Focusing on stand-alone situations implies that we take externality as the only determinant. Given a player i ∈ N , she has two choices concerning externalities, either choosing stand-alone and enjoying the externalities from coalitions consisting of other players or joining some coalitions generating externalities to the players standing alone. Thus, the second term in the above expression corresponds to the first choice and can be understood as player i's expected gain from the externalities of all possible coalitions without containing i, where the distribution of coalitions is such that any ordering of the players is equally likely. The last term, corresponding to the second choice, is player i's expected loss due to joining coalitions, which is expressed as the other players' gain from the externalities of coalitions containing i.
One can find that in the case that any player has identical stand-alone payoffs in a partition function form game, the expected stand-alone value is comparable to the equal surplus solution for TU games in characteristic function form. Let T U N denote the set of all TU games in characteristic function form with player set N . The equal solution surplus E is defined as
and for all i ∈ N . 
Similarly, we can show that
Hence, what remains is obvious.
Therefore, the equal surplus solution E for TU games in characteristic function form is actually a special case of the expected stand-alone value. It can be expressed as
for all v ∈ T U N and for all i ∈ N . Here, the second term is the expected gain as being a stand-alone player while the last term is the expected loss due to joining coalitions.
be a one-point solution concept. We consider the following properties.
• Efficiency:
, and for all completely symmetric players i, j in (N, w) ;
• The quasi-null player property:
for all w ∈ P G N and for any quasi-null player i in (N, w);
The properties of efficiency, complete symmetry, and additivity are clear by themselves. Here, it is necessary to stress the new property: the quasi-null player property.
Let us first discuss the marginal quasi-null player property that assigns zero payoff to a quasi-null player, which is implicitly specified by the Shapley value introduced by Pham Do and Norde (2002). Requiring a solution concept for partition function form games satisfying both efficiency and this marginal quasi-null player property seems inappropriate. For instance, a quasi-null player i who may obtain positive payoff due to the positive externality from coalition N \{i} has to accept zero payoff in the game according to this marginal quasi-null player property. Then, it is hard to imagine that player i could have any incentive to join the grand coalition. As a consequence, it is difficult to justify the efficiency axiom. More generally, the players who may enjoy extremely high positive externalities from other coalitions will choose stand-alone as those effects are not well reflected by the solution concepts that adopt marginal contribution approach. So, the externality has to be taken into consideration.
As we know, the marginal quasi-null player property favors coalitions while it biases against the outside individuals. In order to give a fair treatment to both sides, we have to balance the coalition effect and the externality effect. More specifically, to assign a quasi-null player 0 or e i (w) can be viewed as consequences of two contrastive viewpoints.
Concerning the tradeoff between these two extreme opinions 4 , an impartial decision could be choosing the average as the gain of a quasi-null player, which results in the so-called quasi-null player property.
In addition, one can see that a null player, as a special quasi-null player, could still get positive worth as long as her expected loss from externalities is less than the average value
. This observation implies that the quasi-null player property also has the flavor of egalitarianism or collectivism. The justification is similar to that for the consensus value for TU games in characteristic function form in Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004).
It is shown that the consensus value is the unique function that satisfies these four properties. σ(l) = j, where i, j ∈ N . Letσ ∈ Π(N ) be the permutation which is obtained by interchanging in σ the positions of i and j, i.e.
σ(m)
As σ →σ is bijective, it suffices to prove that s σ i (w) = sσ j (w).
By definition, we know
Note that, by complete symmetry, 
Here, since σ(l − t) =σ(l − t) and S σ l−t \{i} = Sσ l−t \{j}, by complete symmetry, we know w(S
Case 2 : 1 < l < k. The proof is analogous to Case 1. 
Hence, a general expression is provided as follows. 
A general expression is
w(N, {N })
Consider a class P of |N | permutations σ ∈ Π(N ) such that for σ, τ ∈ P it holds that for all j 1 , j 2 ∈ N \{i}
That is, given an ordering of the players N \{i}, let quasi-null player i move from the end to the beginning without changing the other players' relative positions. Summing over the above equations, we get
Since i is a quasi-null player, w(S
Taking all orderings of players into account, we then get
Before proving the uniqueness of the consensus value, we first check the relationship between the consensus value and the Shapley value for partition function form games defined by Pham Do and Norde (2002) . Since the Shapley value assigns zero worth to a quasi-null player, one can see that the quasi-null player property can be reformulated as f i (w) = Proof. Similar to part (iv) in the proof for Theorem 4.5, one can show that for every
In order to prove 5 that the consensus value is the unique solution that satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity, one needs to consider the "standard" basis of partition function form games. Let E (N ) be the set of all (S,
We call δ (S,κ) the Dirac game with respect to (S, κ). One can see that the set of all Dirac games, δ (S,κ) : (S, κ) ∈ E (N ) , forms a basis of partition function form games. Each w ∈ P G N can be uniquely written as
If f is a solution on P G N satisfying additivity, then for all
Lemma 4.7 Let c ∈ R, (S, κ) ∈ E (N ) and i / ∈ S, and f be a solution on P G N satisfying additivity and the quasi-null player property. We have
where w is the partition function such that
Proof. Let c ∈ R, (S, κ) ∈ E (N ) and i / ∈ S. Case 1 : S(κ, i) = {i}. Here, one can readily verify that i is a quasi-null player of game cδ (S,κ) . Hence, by the quasi-null player property, f i cδ (S,κ) = 1 2 e i cδ (S,κ) . Case 2 : S(κ, i) = {i}. Since we can write w = cδ (S,κ) + cδ (S∪{i},(κ\S)∪{S∪{i}}) , and i is a quasi-null player in w, by additivity and the quasi-null player property, we have Proof. From Theorem 4.5, it follows that the consensus value γ satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity.
Conversely, suppose a solution concept f satisfies these four properties. We have to show that f = γ. By additivity, it suffices to show that for any c ∈ R and any (S, 
For any c ∈ R and (S, κ) ∈ E (N ), let I cδ (S,κ) = |S|. In order to prove that f cδ (S,κ) = γ cδ (S,κ) , we use a (converse-)induction argument on the number I cδ (S,κ) .
If I cδ (S,κ) = |N |, then cδ (S,κ) = cδ (N,{N,{N }}) . One can readily check that for all i ∈ N , γ i cδ (N,{N,{N (N,{N,{N }}) . We then complete the first step for the induction argument.
Next, as an induction hypothesis, suppose that for each k ≥ k + 1, if I cδ (S,κ) = k , then f cδ (S,κ) = γ cδ (S,κ) . We need to show that if I cδ (S,κ) = k, then f cδ (S,κ) = γ cδ (S,κ) . Assume that I cδ (S,κ) = k.
First, we shall show that for each i / ∈ S, f i cδ (S,κ) = γ i cδ (S,κ) . Let i / ∈ S, there are two cases:
and if |S| = 1,
Since I cδ (S∪{i},(κ\S)∪{S∪{i}}) = k + 1 and (κ\S) ∪ {S ∪ {i}} = κ S∪{i} , by the induction hypothesis,
Now we need to show that for each i ∈ S, f i cδ (S,κ) = γ i cδ (S,κ) . Let i ∈ S. If S = {i}, since for all j / ∈ S, f j cδ (S,κ) = 0 and all players in S are completely symmetric in cδ (S,κ) , by efficiency and complete symmetry, we have for all i ∈ S,
Therefore,
Thus, if |S| > 1, e i cδ (S,κ) , so
If |S| = 1, e i cδ (S,κ) , so we also have
and all players in S are completely symmetric in cδ (S,κ) , by efficiency and complete symmetry, we have for all i ∈ S,
If S = {i}, by efficiency, obviously, f i cδ (S,κ) = γ i cδ (S,κ) .
We now provide an alternative characterization for the consensus value by means of the transfer property, which is in the same spirit as that for the Shapley value for the case of TU games in characteristic function form (cf. Feltkamp (1995) ).
The transfer property, introduced by Dubey (1975) , that in some sense substitutes for additivity, is defined as follows. For any two partition function form games w 1 , w 2 ∈ P G N , we first define the games (w 1 ∨w 2 ) and (w 1 ∧w 2 ) by (w 1 ∨w 2 )(S, κ) = max{w 1 (S, κ), w 2 (S, κ)} and (w 1 ∧w 2 )(S, κ) = min{w 1 (S, κ), w 2 (S, κ)} for all S ∈ κ and κ ∈ P(N ). , κ)δ (S,κ) ).
(1)
Proof. We prove in three steps that equation (1) holds.
Step 1 : For the class of all non-negative games w the proof is by induction on
Here, a game w is non-negative if
Take k > 0 and suppose equation (1) holds for all non-negative games w with k(w) < k. For a non-negative game w with
Hence, using the induction hypothesis and the transfer property, we obtain
Step 2 : For non-positive games one proves analogously (interchanging the operations ∧ and ∨) that equation (1) holds.
Step 3 : For an arbitrary game w, split the game into its non-negative part v ∨ 0 and its non-positive part v ∧ 0. The transfer property and steps 1 and 2 imply
Hence equation (1) holds for all partition function form games.
Note that the converse is also true: If a solution concept f on P G N satisfies equation ( 
where w is defined in Lemma 4.7.
Proof. Let c ∈ R, (S, κ) ∈ E (N ) and i / ∈ S. The proof is the same as that for Lemma 4.7 except for the case when S(κ, i) = {i}. Since here we can write w = cδ (S,κ) ∨ cδ (S∪{i},(κ\S)∪{S∪{i}}) , by the transfer property, we have
Thus, f i (w) = f i cδ (S,κ) + f i cδ (S∪{i},(κ\S)∪{S∪{i}}) . Moreover, since i is a quasi-null player in w, by the quasi-null player property, we know f i (w) = e i (w). Therefore,
Using Lemma 4.9 and Lemma 4.10, we now prove the following. Then, using additivity,
Therefore, the consensus value satisfies the transfer property. As mentioned in Section 4, dependent on the degree to which that the coalition effect or externality effect is preferred by a society, the quasi-null player property can be generalized. In particular, for θ = 1, the generalized consensus value is the Shapley value; for θ = 0, the generalized consensus value equals the expected stand-alone value. The proof is omitted as it is obvious.
The idea of defining the consensus value can also be extended. If taking the size of the incumbent party S into consideration, we can argue on a basis of a proportional principle that given an ordering of players the entrant should get 
respectively. Player i's reaction curve is implicitly defined by the first order condition:
A Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a vector such that each player's action x i is a best response to the complementary choice x −i = (x 1 , ..., x i−1 , x i+1 , ..., x n ). This equilibrium is graphically the intersection point of all reaction curves and algebraically the solution of the system of the equations (2) Now suppose that after sufficient communication, some players may agree to cooperate (for example, players intend to adjust negative externalities which are caused by decreasing returns to inputs). In such a situation a coalition structure might form, in which, however, the payoff of coalition S depends on the behavior of the players outside S, and visa versa. Notice that the payoff for coalition S under one coalition structure is different from that under another coalition structure if the number of coalitions is different. Assume that the marginal cost of coalition S is c S = min i∈S c i , that is, the most efficient technology in a coalition can be costlessly adopted by all players in that coalition. Moreover, if a coalition structure κ = {S 1 , S 2 , ..., S k } is formed, then, in equilibrium each coalition S in κ will choose the total (input) quantity levels to maximize the sum of its members' profits, given the total inputs of the other coalitions in κ.
Let x S j = i∈S j x i denote the total input level for a coalition S j and π S j (x) denote the profit of coalition S j under coalition structure κ,
Coalition S j 's reaction curve under coalition structure κ is also implicitly defined by the first order condition:
The unique equilibrium under coalition structure κ with quantities x * = (x * S 1 , x * S 2 , ..., x * S k ), and profit π S j (x * ) of coalition S j , is given by
The oligopoly game in partition function form (N, w) is determined for every (S j , κ) by
, where x * is the equilibrium vector under coalition structure κ. To get further illustration of how the consensus value can be used we specify the 3-person oligopoly game in partition function form (N, w) . The partition function form game is given byw (1, 2, 3) = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 
